

24 May 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support for Counterinsurgency Planning

REFERENCE: DD/I Memorandum to DCI, "DD/I Comments on [REDACTED] Memorandum for the Special Group (CI), 'Intelligence Requirements for Counterinsurgency,'" dated 11 April 1962


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In amplification of the DD/I comments previously provided the Director on the Joint Staff's "Counterinsurgency EEI," we believe that the following general concepts may be useful in defining the intelligence community's responsibilities in supporting counterinsurgency planning at the Washington level:

1. Much of the intelligence required for counterinsurgency planning is also required in various other aspects of cold war planning and operations and is already available in various usable forms, ranging from the NIS and other government-supported area handbooks to NIEs and SNIEs. It is essential to make full use of this available material.

2. At least with respect to the military counterinsurgency planners, there is a pressing need for an intelligence officer or officers within the counterinsurgency planning element itself to

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assist in procuring and interpreting relevant available intelligence material, identifying and dealing with intelligence gaps and requirements, and handling the flow of incoming intelligence reports and studies. This close-support function cannot be effectively performed by the intelligence community as a whole or, in all probability, by DIA as such.

3. The intelligence community as a whole should support the counterinsurgency planning effort mainly through:

a. The NIS program, altered and speeded up as necessary to serve counterinsurgency and other cold war planning more effectively.

b. The USIB Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations and the planned Regional Estimative Reviews, both of which are designed to assist counterinsurgency and other cold war planners in identifying and assessing situations or contingencies of potential concern to the US.

c. Provision for handling counterinsurgency collection requirements (most of which can probably be handled in normal fashion).

d. Provision for various forms of review from the intelligence point of view of draft counterinsurgency plans and

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
staff studies, much as is done for draft Guidelines and other policy drafts.

e. Establishment, where particular situations warrant, of Ad Hoc USIB subcommittees to evaluate and collate evidence. These committees would be analogous to the USIB subcommittees on the Arab-Israeli Situation, Berlin, and the Bloc Military Buildup in Cuba.

4. In addition, the intelligence community can assist the counterinsurgency planning effort through:

a. Recognition, in the selection of materials for current daily and weekly publications, of increased reader interest in insurgency situations. This would particularly apply to the situation summaries and special articles carried in the back of the DIA Daily Summary and the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary.

b. The continued inclusion in NIEs and SNIEs, as necessary for national level policy formulation, of analysis and judgments bearing on the insurgency problem. Such material has normally been included in estimates on countries, such as Colombia and South Vietnam, where insurgency has posed a major problem.



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